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For a variety of reasons, many developing countries especially since the 1990s 
have embarked on programmes of democratic decentralization that are aimed at 
creating local self-governing systems that are democratic, relatively autonomous and 
effective in delivering services. Finding independent sources of financing for these 
emerging, locally based organs of governance has been one of the central challenges 
that confront these efforts in most countries. The literature suggests that sources of 
independent local government revenue are few in poor countries. As a result, most 
countries design decentralization programmes that depend heavily on 
intergovernmental transfers from national to local governments. Given widespread 
poverty that exists in most developing countries, this is a crucial strategy. However, 
the problem is that many central governments are engulfed in a systemic financial 
crisis and are desperately exploring strategies for reducing their expenditure 
commitments. One outcome is that revenue transfers are often irregular or fall much 
below the levels of expenditure decentralization, leading to serious fiscal gaps at the 
local level. Even where transfers are adequate and reliable, a fiscal regime which 
compels local actors to depend so heavily on central financial arrangements for 
practically all of their expenditure requirements undermines the development of 
lateral (local state-citizen) rather than vertical (central-local state) relations within the 
state, with serious implications for public participation and effective accountability.  
In the meantime, cities of developing countries continue to grow 
phenomenally in a way that makes conventional strategies for financing urban 
infrastructures unsustainable. Many analysts view this rapid urbanization as fatally 
aggravating the problem of urban/local governance. This paper suggests a different 
and more positive view. It reviews the literature which concedes that property taxation 
remains largely untapped and might indeed be progressive in developing countries. 
This literature highlights mainly the technical constraints to progress-assessment, 
valuation and collection. In contrast, this paper contends that the tax suffers from a 
combination of political and technical factors where the latter are dependent not 
independent variables. The paper undertakes an analysis of the key stakeholders in 
implementing successful property taxation policies based on research conducted in 
four countries- India, Nigeria, Republic of South Africa and Zimbabwe in the early 
1990s. The paper suggests that willingness, opportunity and capacity remain critical 
factors and demonstrates how opposition to the tax can be overcome by strategic 
 partnerships between central and local governments, public and private and domestic 
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   1  DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES SINCE THE 1990S 
Whether in terms of local governments (semi-autonomous bodies) or field 
administrations of the central government, industrialized countries are more 
decentralized than developing countries. Central governments in industrialized 
(OECD) countries engage twice the number of officials as the less developed 
countries (LDCs) of Asia, Latin America but they engage four times the number of 
local government employees (Schiavo-Campo 1998). The difference is equally 
reflected in total government expenditures as a ratio of local government 
expenditures.
1 Field administrations of central governments in developing countries 
are no different. Generally, a substantial proportion of central government employees 
in developing countries lives and works in the capital city. In contrast, only a small 
proportion of central government employees lives and works in the headquarters in 
most industrialized countries (ICs). The proportion of headquarter to field officials is 
20% in the United Kingdom, 25% in France and only 12% in the USA. In contrast, 
more central government officials in LDCs live and work at the headquarters (Smith 
1985; Olowu 1984). Moreover, the underlying theory of governance in industrialized 
countries is a reflection of the long struggle for the accountable use of power. This has 
led to deliberate checks and balance on central power most evident in the 
simultaneous exercise of power by autonomous entities: the church, municipalities, 
universities, trade unions, etc. This model of governance, polycentricity, is regarded 
as a crucial attribute of democracy (V. Ostrom 1987; E. Ostrom 1990). Different 
patterns of polycentricity are observable among western countries, with variations in 
form reflecting peculiar national cultures (Andrew and Magnusson 1998). 
In contrast, political leaders in LDCs have generally preferred highly 
centralized modes of governance. This governance mode is reinforced by a culture of 
politics of patrimony in which all powers and resources flow from the ruler (‘the 
father of the nation’) to clients who shore up the regime. The pattern of power and 
resource distribution was strongly supported by both domestic and external actors 
until the late 1980s. Reasons adduced for adopting this approach included rapid 
economic and social development actualized through centralized planning, unity and 
                                                 
1 Of the available statistics, local governments in industrialized countries are responsible for an average 
of 20-35% of total government expenditures while the average for LDCs is less than 15% (UNDP 
1993:69). 
1 national integration, containment of corruption and political stability. In fact, it was 
argued that if decentralization would be necessary at all it must be in the form of 
administrative decentralization or deconcentration (Riggs 1964, Wunsch & Olowu 
1990). This monocentric  governance model affected the manner in which 
decentralization was approached--administrative decentralization or deconcentration 
rather than political or democratic decentralization. 
In the last decade, however, many developing countries have changed course 
dramatically. They have abandoned the monocentric political model and sought to 
replace it with its exact opposite – a polycentric structure of governance, the idea of 
multiple centres of power within a state – which was denied by the monocentric state 
(McCarney 1996, Olowu 2003). What is the evidence of this shift? 
The evidence of a paradigm shift can be found in the increasing emphasis on 
local governance as a part of the programme of democratic governance reform. A 
number of scholarly and policy studies on the subject have documented this evidence. 
The extent of change has been massive and sustained over time than witnessed in the 
past with several of these countries defying the ‘pendulum model’ (Mawhood 1984:8) 
by which a decade of democratic decentralization is followed by another decade of 
centralization. Responsibilities and financial resources – revenue sourcing and 
transfers, powers to borrow – as well as human resources and accountability 
arrangements have been transferred from central governments to local communities in 
many countries. Four of these comparative studies are reviewed here. They can be 
further corroborated with specific national experiences from LDCs—the experiences 
of India, the Philippines, Colombia, Nigeria and Uganda have been particularly 
notable (see Mitra 2001, Fizbein 1997, Olowu 1990, Olowu & Wunsch 2003, Olowu 
2003). The UNDP (2002) noted that 80% of developing and transition countries were 
experimenting with some form of (democratic) decentralization, a figure consistent 
with an earlier study of the UNDP/UNHCS/World Bank in the early 1990s that 
showed that only 63 countries out of 75 developing and transitional countries with 
population greater than 5 million have embarked on the transfer of power to 
democratically elected councils at intermediate and local levels (Dillinger 1993). 
Other scholars like Crook and Manor (1998) studied four countries (Ghana 
and Cote d’ Ivoire in Africa and Bangladesh and the Indian State of Karnartarka in 
South Asia) and showed that the transfer of responsibility, resources and 
accountability to local communities led to considerably enhanced levels of 
2 participation by citizens in governance, when measured by both electoral and non-
electoral indices and in some cases these were much higher than levels of 
participation in several western countries’ local governments (p. 271). As to the key 
question whether democratic decentralization (DD) increased level of participation 
led to improved performance of local governments in delivering basic community 
services, they returned an affirmative response although African cases generally 
performed poorly compared to the South Asian cases. This is quite different from the 
past reluctance of LDC national governments to empower local or municipal 
governments and complements a long line of research in Latin America that has 
demonstrated this pattern since the late 1970s. Asian and African cases came later 
(OECD 1997; Litvack et al. 1998, Olowu & Wunsch 2004). 
Similarly, two comparative studies on health sector decentralization used the 
novel approach of ‘decision space’ allowed to local governments by the national 
government. The concept of decision space analyses the range of choice that 
municipalities were allowed to exercise over different functions in financing, service 
delivery, human resources, targeting and governance. The studies on three Latin 
American countries – Chile, Colombia and Bolivia – found that there was a tendency 
for the decision space to be wide initially and to reduce over time. Moreover, greater 
choice was allowed local government decision-makers with respect to contracting for 
private services and internal governance while financial allocations were moderate but 
their choices over human resources, service provision and targeting of priority 
programs were much limited and remained centralized. Generally, local governments 
were able to make innovative decisions and one of the notable effects of 
decentralization was its positive impact on equity, a tendency for wealthier and poorer 
municipalities to have similar per capita expenditures. An important explanation for 
differential performance was varying institutional capacities—where institutional 
capacity was weak as in Bolivia, the achievements of decentralization were weak. The 
same patterns were observed in the second set of studies which included – the 
Philippines, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia. The Philippines had the highest degree of 
decision space partly because of the country’s institutional capacities as well as the 
form of decentralization – devolution (not deconcentration nor managerial delegation 
as in the other countries) (Bossert 2000; Bossert et al. 2000). 
A number of other international organizations have conducted studies on the 
issue. First, the World Bank (1997) in its landmark World Development Report 1997 
3 reports the fact that ‘developing countries which went through a nation-building phase 
in the 1950s and 1960s were becoming more decentralized in terms of expenditures 
and revenues since the 1970s’ (p 121). Local revenue and expenditure 
decentralization had increased in several LDCs, especially Latin American countries 
(table 1). 
TABLE 1 
Changes in subnational finance in selected countries 
(Percentage of expenditures or revenues for all levels of government) 
  SUBNATIONAL EXPENDITURES  SUB NATIONALREVENUES 
Country 1974  1994  Trend    1974  1994  Trend 
Argentina 25  45  ↑   25  37  ↑ 
Australia 47  49     20  27  ↑ 
Brazil 30  38  ↑   23  25   
Canada 61  60     39  44  ↑ 
Chile 2  9  ↑   2  5   
Colombia 25  33  ↑   16  18   
France 18  19     6  13  ↑ 
Germany 44  40     34  30   
India 45  49     27  25   
Indonesia 11  15     3  3   
Iran, Islamic Rep. of  1  5     1  6  ↑ 
Malaysia 18  14  ↓   13  8  ↓ 
Romania 16  10     12  6  ↓ 
South Africa  24  41  ↑   4  12  ↑ 
Spain   10  34  ↑   5  12  ↑ 
Sweden 44  34  ↓   28  32   
Thailand 17  8  ↓   5  5   
United Kingdom  33  28  ↓   15  8  ↓ 
United States  45  44     33  36   
Zimbabwe 26  25     24  15  ↓ 
Note: Data are for all levels of government other than central government. Data include transfers from central 
government to subnational governments. Arrows indicate changes of 5 percentage points or more. 
Where data for 1974 or 1994 were unavailable (indicated by italics), data for the closest available year were 
used. Data for Germany for 1974 refer to the preunification territory. 
Source: World Bank, 1997 (Calculated from IMF records for various years). 
 
Similarly, a study conducted by the International Labor Office (ILO 2001) 
found that devolutionary decentralization was a reality in developing countries in the 
management of many municipal services (education, health, transportation, waste 
management). It also noted that employee size increased at the sub-national levels in 
many countries for which data was available (Mauritius, Philippines, Botswana, 
Uganda, South Africa and Costa Rica). In the Philippines, 73% of all the health sector 
staff was transferred to local governments. Ethiopian regional states have today ten 
times more staff than the federal government (Beyene 1999). The World Health 
Organization also documented for countries similar patterns for countries like 
Colombia, Nigeria, Uganda, and South Korea (WHO 2002). Finally, the Danish 
4 National Association of Local Authorities (NALAD) together with a consortium of 
other bilateral and multilateral donors on six African countries (Ghana, Senegal, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) found that ‘the countries in the sub-
Saharan African Region are all at different stages in the decentralization process...as a 
group these countries comprise a virtual continuum of the steps necessary to build 
strong municipal governance and infrastructure delivery systems’  (Steffensen and 
Trollegaard 2000:14). Responsibilities, resources and accountability are being moved 
from the central to local governments and the report notes that local government (LG) 
expenditure and revenue levels increased between 1994 and 1997 in all six countries. 
 
 
2  MAJOR PROBLEMS OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE IN LDCS 
Implementation of local governance has confronted four major problems in 
LDCs, when sufficient political commitment has been found to support devolution at 
the national level. First, there are problems of recentralizing decentralized powers; 
second, weak capacity of local governments (and often times of the central 
governments to manage decentralization) is also a frequently cited issue. Thirdly, 
inadequate financing of local governments is a perennial problem as is the problem of 
effective accountability of local governments for the use of powers and resources 
devolved to them. I will argue in this paper that the financing issue is the most 
important for most developing countries because once resolved, it provides the clue 
for the resolution of all other problems.  
Political—a critical problem of local self governance in many developing 
countries is the idea of shared sovereignty as decentralization defined spheres and 
limits of each level of governance. For countries long used to dominance of the 
central authorities, often with little opportunity for opposition voices, this is a tough 
challenge. Two serious problematic emanating from this problem are: –a) imbalance 
between transferred powers and resources and b) the tendency towards 
recentralization of powers earlier granted to local sub-national entities. For instance, 
in Rwanda, three major revenue sources (property taxes, trading and tax on rental 
income) were devolved to local governments as a part of post-genocide rehabilitation 
and governance reform in May 2002. But the most important of these three – property 
tax – was suspended shortly afterwards in August 2003 because of poor design of the 
tax laws (Karamaga 2004). But this is not peculiar to this country, other national 
5 experiences – especially for the Philippines, Argentina and other African countries – 
are well documented (Eaton 2001, Wunsch 2001). 
Capacity—of all the capacities required by local governments, the most crucial 
is adequate human resource capacity to carry out decentralized powers, especially as 
it refers to the technical aspects of decentralized functions. This is because local 
government tasks are often labour-intensive, they require dealing with people. The 
transfer of skilled central personnel to LGs leads to conflict of loyalties for these 
officers between the central government where all personnel decisions are made and 
the locality where they serve. An exclusively locally managed personnel system may 
also be too narrow for professional development or may be heavily politicized. On the 
other hand, Friszbein shows that Colombian municipalities have been turned around 
by democratically elected political leaders who have brought about a wide range of 
positive innovations, a subject that is well covered in the local government reform 
literature in Latin America (Fiszbein 1997, Campbell 1997). Unfortunately, many 
decentralization programmes lack the detail human resource management analysis 
needed to sustain a successful attraction and retention of required skilled personnel in 
(to) local governments (see Kolemainen-Aitken 1998). 
Finance—a crucial reason why many municipalities are not able to raise good 
quality personnel is often due to their parlous finances. Local governments are usually 
assigned low-yielding revenue sources backed up by substantial transfers from the 
central government. While this helps to provide a necessary boost for local 
governments, the problem with transfers is that they are tied to the limitations of 
central finances and procedures. Secondly, they serve in some cases to discourage 
local revenue sourcing and could work to limit local autonomous action. We return to 
the issues in greater detail in later sections of this paper. 
Accountability—most LGs in LDCs are directly accountable to central 
governments and the principal instrument used by the national government to assert 
accountability is suspension or closure of councils. This issue was so widespread in 
Indian local government that up to 50% of local governments were under suspension 
at one time. Complaint against this practice led to the 1992 constitutional amendment 
which limited the powers of central over local governments (see Mitra 2001, deWit 
2004). Municipal closure is also widespread in many African countries—Namibia, 
Botswana, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Nigeria to mention only a few. Only in a few 
countries are LGs accountable to the local citizens through direct and indirect 
6 accountability systems. The closure of even one local government because of alleged 
or actual demeanor by the central government denies local governments and the 
people an opportunity for self-learning but it is politically convenient. More effective 
local accountability arrangements can be found in some Latin American countries 
where substantial fiscal decentralization has taken place and a number of direct 
mechanisms such as the participatory budgeting have been developed to complement 
the generally weak conventional forms of local accountability (Santos 1998, Blair 
2000). Such arrangements help in developing local self-governance as local 
governments build lateral relationships among other local organs for delivering 
services and of mutual accountability (Fiszbein 2001). 
These problems are of course interrelated and mutually reinforcing. We argue 
in this paper that an effective intervention strategy for breaking this vicious cycle of 
local government poverty is via the development of effective local government 
revenue system (see below). 
 
 
3  THE CHALLENGE OF FINANCING DEMOCRATIC LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Conventional literature on fiscal decentralization – developed originally in 
developed countries to analyze multi-level governance systems – assumes that 
poverty condemns developing countries to highly centralized systems of local 
financing. The argument is supported on two grounds. First, the preponderant 
population in developing countries is poor and therefore services must be provided for 
them by central agencies. Moreover, distributive function – which is at the heart of 
poverty alleviation – is a central rather than local government function. 
Prudhomme (1995:202) in an oft-cited article on the subject has summarized 
the classical position on this subject. According to him, the redistribution of income 
should remain the responsibility of the central government for two reasons. ‘First, 
attempts by local governments to redress income disparities are likely to be unfair. 
The poor in well-off regions will fare better than the poor in deprived regions…… 
Second, decentralized redistribution policies are self-defeating (as high taxes in one 
jurisdiction) will lead to the rich leaving for more lightly taxed areas while the poor 
will tend to move in from areas that offer lower benefits. The generous jurisdiction 
will soon be unable to sustain its policy’. 
7 He then concludes that any reduction in national budgets in favour of sub-
regional governments increases national disparities as national budgets tend to reduce 
regional disparities (ibid: 203). In contrast, Paul Smoke while conceding the core 
notion that distribution is a national government responsibility, contests this position 
in the light of the work of other analysts who have challenged the classical position on 
both theoretical and analytical grounds. He cites case literature that underscores the 
importance of solidarity—rich people in the same communities are willing to pay 
higher taxes to raise the incomes of poor people in their own areas. He cites some 
literature which show that state governments in the United States for instance play a 
more substantial role in distribution than was ‘previously believed possible’ (Smoke 
1994:27). This evidence is not confined to the USA however. Indeed, the history of 
local government in Europe as Bob Bennett (1994) reminds us is tied to the 
development of ecclesiastical parishes and communes whose primary objective was to 
assist the poor. It is therefore not accidental that social welfare provision in most 
European countries were initiated by local governments before they were taken over 
by the state and even then local governments have played a major role as agents of the 
national government in administering welfare. But Smoke’s original contribution with 
relevance to the application of fiscal decentralization in LDCs is to cast aspersion on 
the assumption of easy mobility by people, whether rich or poor. He then concludes 
that ‘some decentralized redistribution occurs in many countries because local 
governments provide at least some basic services that benefit the poor, who may pay 
few or no taxes (ibid: 28). 
The experiences of various countries in developed and LDCs lend credence to 
the idea that local governments can be effective agents in fighting poverty especially 
within their jurisdictions but also in correcting inter-regional inequalities. Some of the 
best cases are Kerala in India, Brazil, Nigeria (see Stohr & Fraser 1974, Crook & 
Manor 1998). But one important implication of the predominant position is that 
decentralization programmes in most developing countries have been based mainly on 
central government transfers to local governments as a way of correcting regional 
disparities rather than local government revenues. A World Bank (1998) report on the 
subject noted that transfers constitute the largest source of local revenue for local 
governments and suggested ways in which this can be further improved. The 
preference for transfers is based on a number of other factors, which include the 
relative ease with which national governments can collect personal and non-personal 
8 taxes, the perception that there exists no taxable capacity within local communities 
and the difficulties traditionally associated with collecting local revenues, by local 
authorities. 
There are however serious problems with this approach. The first is that many 
central governments are themselves revenue short, as a result of high debt servicing, 
excessive employee sizes and payments, global economic downturn, war, 
mismanagement or graft. Secondly, the approach is not likely to enhance their 
effectiveness or sustainability as it opens them up to the vagaries of and instabilities 
of central government funding. Indeed many developing countries – especially the 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) such as Uganda or several of the Francophone 
states of West Africa –  central governments depend on donor funds to finance 
development projects (see Doe 1998). Thirdly, the resulting high dependency on 
central funds (which in many cases are unpredictable) reinforces and sustains the 
paternalist attitudes of the central government of the pre-devolution era. 
Fourthly, it leaves local government taxes underdeveloped. Whereas 
outstanding results have been achieved in central government tax reforms, local tax 
systems have remained, as they were in many countries in the colonial period. The 
poll tax or octroi belong to this category. As presently organized, these taxes raise 
problems of horizontal and vertical equity; large numbers of beneficiaries from public 
services are excluded. The octroi is like a city-based import-export tax and therefore a 
constraint to trading while the poll tax has been determined as inefficient on an input-
output basis in the country where it is most developed (Livingstone & Charlton 1998, 
Mathur 2003). Fifthly, the continuing dependence on central government transfers 
weakens the accountability of local governments as the elites who could ensure that 
local governments are accountable have little moral or legal motivation to do so under 
a regime of high fiscal dependence on central grants (Guyer 1992, Moore 1998). 
Finally, it inhibits the development of independent local government capital 
financing. This is because most private sector financial institutions are not like to 
regard (usually) unreliable transfers as collateral for loans in the way that real 
property is regarded (Dillinger 1989). 
The problem of developing alternatives to these crude local taxes mentioned 
above are also well known. There are severe limits to using user charges to finance 
general services such as basic education and basic health. Central organs often better 
collect most other possible tax sources such as the business or valued added taxes and 
9 in some countries these are shared with local governments. The idea of local income 
taxes is not an attractive one as national governments still confront serious difficulties 
to collect other direct taxes. It seems clear then that there are few alternatives to the 
property tax and, as shown below, the fact that some countries collect substantial 
sums from this source to finance infrastructure projects suggests that much more is 
possible in developing countries than has been seen. 
However, the most serious objection to local taxation is the idea that local tax 
capacities do not exist. The fact of the matter though is that only a few large corporate 
operators and mainly public operations and employees fall into the tax net. The mass 
of others pay no taxes whatever. Yet, as table 2 shows, the problem of the poor 
distribution of economic resources in developing countries is a serious one. There is a 
need for effective systems of transfers from the rich to the poor via the tax system. 
And since the national tax systems have reached their highest possible levels – given 
the capacity of the national governments – the informal economy represented by real 
estate represents one of the most effective ways of mobilizing resources locally for 
financing infrastructure development in developing countries. In the latter countries, 
public action led to public policies that transferred resources via the tax system to 
reduce inequalities (Wuyts et al. 1996). This instrument is hardly available to many 
developing countries since many are so heavily dependent on indirect rather than 
direct taxes (although public officials and a few large private enterprises bear a heavy 
burden of taxation) and aid (see World Bank 2000: 29-30). 
TABLE 2  
Average Gini Index by region in the 1990’s 
CONTINENT  AVERAGES (NO OF COUNTRIES) 
  <40%  40-49%  >50%  Av 
Africa 34%  (8)  42% (10)  55% (9)  44% 
Asia 34%  (7)  43% (5)  0% (0)  39% 
East European  28% (12)  45% (3)  0% (0)  37% 
O.E.C.D. 30.1%  (18)  41% (1)  0% (0)  36% 
South / Latin 
America  0% (0)  47% (3)  57% (9)  52% 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002  
Note: Gini Coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households 




In the absence of effective transfer systems, two types of responses have 
emerged in several LDCs. First, in many local communities, some form of community 
10 action has been used to set up informal structures of governance. These have become 
the effective local government systems. They raise resources by encouraging the rich 
to contribute in terms commensurate with their incomes and status. Town unions have 
been documented in Nigeria and in many communities they are the de facto local 
governments (Barkan et al. 1991, Olowu et al. 1991). In the same vein, the Kenyan 
government has instituted this into the policy of harambe (Barkan 1994). 
Alternatively, informal trust cooperatives are created and the tontines of Cameroon 
are the best known (Adamolekun et al. 1990). Failing these, the result has been 
various forms of bad governance – corruption, warfare, banditry and other forms of 
violent responses – whether in Sri Lanka, Colombia or parts of West Africa (Reno 
1998). 
Contrarily, the fact that poor people are able to raise revenues for services they 
regard as essential is borne out by a number of studies. A recent global study of 
participatory poverty appraisal conducted by the World Bank in 60 countries in 1999 
shows that most of the formal state and non-state institutions are neither trusted by the 
poor nor do they prove helpful to them. They regard these institutions as oppressive 
and poverty aggravating. In contrast, community based organizations were regarded 
as the most effective and most trusted organisations whether in rural or urban areas 
(Narayan et al. 2001). It also reinforces other national studies that show that local 




4  PROPERTY RATES AS AN EFFECTIVE REVENUE BASE FOR 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS IN LDCS 
The key question is what should constitute the base for a local revenue system 
for local governments. For urban centres, of the three possible bases—property, sales 
and income, the most widely used and the most highly recommended is property tax.
2 
But it is also the one that is yet to be fully utilized in many LDCs. 
Many years ago, Ursula Hicks (1961:347) argued that property taxes were the 
most appropriate for municipal governments. She gave five reasons: automatic 
localization, clear jurisdiction, ability to pay, steady revenues for local governments 
                                                 
2 In the British tradition, local government taxes are ‘rates’. 
11 and its suitability for budget balancing. Bahl and Linn (1992) have added two further 
reasons for a fuller exploitation of the property tax in developing countries. First, the 
property tax is the most important local government revenue, responsible for one-third 
of the local tax in cities where substantial responsibility and revenues are allowed 
municipalities. On the basis of the wealth of data, which they gathered, they argue 
that where local government taxes play a major role in financing urban public 
services; the property tax will be an important source of revenue. 
Second, they contest that contrary to the conventional position, property taxes 
are not regressive in developing countries. Even though there is need for urgent 
reforms – especially with respect to its multiple objectives, management and 
exemptions –  the tax was largely progressive in developing countries and also has the 
potential to serve positive allocative goals. The experiences of both developed and 
developing countries with the tax generally confirm these positions. 
 
4.1  Experiences of developed and developing countries 
The history of the property tax has been so closely tied to the development of 
local government in the developed countries to merit repetition here. The Layfield 
Local Government Finance Commission Report in the United Kingdom (1976:151) 
noted that: ‘taxes on property form part of the taxation system of most developed 
countries and feature very frequently as local taxes’. Similarly in a review of several 
(mostly developed countries) local government finance systems, A. H. Marshall 
(1969:20) reports that ‛taxes on owners and occupiers of real estate remain the most 
general kind of local tax. Almost all countries use them’. The tax is regarded as: 
a) Operating for several centuries and are generally accepted as an integral and 
necessary part of local government; 
b) Generally accepted as the ideal base for local taxes, being visible and stable; 
c) Difficult to avoid; 
d) Providing a realistic and stable base from which a local authority can make 
reasonable forecasts of likely future income, with a substantial certain and 
predictable yield; 
e) Relatively easy and inexpensive to collect, and are administered at less than 2 per 
cent of yield; 
12 f) Obtained locally and unique to local government, thus enhancing local authorities’ 
status; 
g) Stimulates occupier interest in local government;  
h) Non-excessive for the majority of the payers; and  
i) Tends to encourage fuller occupation of property. 
The experience of developing countries with the property tax is more varied. 
Yet, in a global review of the experience of developing countries, Bahl and Lin (1992: 
81) offered a hypothesis that was largely confirmed by their data on 49 cities in 22 
countries. It is that where local government taxes play an important role in financing 
urban public services, property tax will be an important revenue source. Financing 
pressures on local governments and other problems of the tax have made the search 
for alternative revenue sources necessary since 1980 but the thesis is generally 
regarded to be consistent with the experiences of many developing countries and data 
provided by others who have worked on the subject (e.g. Dillinger 1988, Keith 1993). 
On the whole, property tax reforms are considered important in developing 
countries for several reasons. First, they are regarded to be generally under- explored 
and under- exploited even in those municipalities where they generate a substantial 
proportion of the total internally generated revenue. Second, they provide 
opportunities for the strengthening of local governments, since the development of the 
tax will not eat into central government’s own revenue sources, a major problem 
confronting financial decentralization in the Third World. Third, in the wake of 
economic crisis and adjustment, central governments have been forced to reduce the 
transfers they provide for local governments. Several, shortfalls in revenue which 
these mean for local government can only be met by developing new revenue sources 
such as property tax or increasing its yield where they are already being collected. 
Fourthly, as noted earlier, analysis by economists have demonstrated beyond 
reasonable doubt that this tax is in fact inherently progressive rather than regressive, 
other things being equal, in developing country circumstances. Features which are 
found to increase the progressivity of the urban property tax are; progressively 
graduated tax rates, exemption of low value properties, higher than average tax rates 
on vacant lots or commercial properties, lower tax rates on improvement than on site 
(land) value and better than average collection efforts for high value properties. (Lin 
1983, Bahl & Lin 1993). 
13 Fifthly, using the tax enables central grants to be used exclusively in for less 
wealthy (rural) localities. It is also thought to encourage a more productive use of 
urban land space as well as appropriate fertility behaviours (Bird 1990:285, 
Mabogunje 1973). Several cities in developing countries have been found to be 
‘parasitic’ on their respective rural economies. Mabogunje for instance found that 143 
(49%) of a total number of 293 urban centres (200 and above) in Nigeria can be 
classified as ‘parasitic’ and another 100 others were marginally so (Mabogunje 
1968:316). This skewed concentration of government investments tends to promote 
fertility behaviours which are oblivious of the costs of urban life. 
Finally, in the absence of a good local tax such as the property taxes, local 
government become hopelessly dependent on the central government transfers which 
are not always reliable, buoyant or paid regularly. An important danger as shown 
above is that central government revenue sources are heavily dependent on taxes on 
international trade, which are subject to sudden and major swings of the international 
market. In contrast, the services for which local governments are responsible are 
constant and increasing as the urban population increases phenomenally. 
The findings from two research projects on this issue is presented below. The 
first is from a comparative survey of nine (9) cities in four countries and the other was 





5  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE –FOUR DEVELOPING COMMONWEALTH 
COUNTRIES 
Nine local governments were selected from four countries, all from the 
Commonwealth and hence having been exposed to the same legal and local 
government tradition. Whereas three of these countries had developed their property 
tax systems, one had not—except in one city. Even in the countries with well- 
developed property tax legislations, some cities rely on other local revenue sources 
(see table 3). The research sought to compare and explain the differences. The 
findings showed that all the  nine  cities  received  a portion of their revenues from the 
                                                 
3 Both researches were sponsored by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada. 
The first study is already published while the other is still in mimeograph (see Olowu 2000, Olowu et 
al. 1994). 
14 TABLE 3 
Basic financial information on selected cities / countries 
1993 / 1994 
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Source: field and various city budgets; and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),  
World Development Report 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
Key: I-Decentralized Governance; III-Centralized Governance; III-Mixed (see Olowu 2000). 
 
property tax. Cities with high property taxes are also those with strong democratic 
local government traditions (the cities of Zimbabwe, Republic of South Africa (RSA) 
and India and Lagos State in Nigeria). The obverse was the case for the other cities 
(e.g. Kano, Delhi in Nigeria and India respectively) even though other cities in the 
same countries. 
Second, property tax topped the revenue source in three cities: Hydebrad, 39% 
(India), Harare (27%) and Kariba (23%) in Zimbabwe. But in four other cities the 
property tax was responsible for over 16% of total revenue of the municipal 
governments. In each of these cities, property tax was the second largest revenue 
earner: Cape Town (27%, after Electricity and Water Sales 52%), Durban25%, after 
electricity sales, 40%), and Lagos (16%, after Transfers 64%). Generally, cities – with 
strong transfers as their major revenue sources such as Delhi, (56%) and Kano (912%) 
– have not developed their property tax systems. Bombay belongs to a different 
15 category. It generates a high proportion of its revenue (up to 91%) from a 
controversial local revenue source, the Octroi. 
Finally, the cities with high property taxation as a proportion of local revenue 
had access to higher revenue per capita compared to those that were dependent on 
transfers or other local sources of revenue such as Octroi or poll tax. The problems of 
Octroi and the poll tax have are well discussed in the literature (see World Bank 1995, 
Ikhide 1995, Livingstone & Charlton 1998). 
In sum then, there is a strong association between property revenues and 
democratic local government and stronger revenue generation. Of course, the paucity 
of our data makes generalizations extremely difficult but the same ideas were 
confirmed by the much larger samples of Bahl and Lin (1992:81). In order to pursue 
the variations between cities reliant on property tax and those reliant on other revenue 
sources, the Nigerian case presented a good case study. 
 
 
6  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE—TEN CITIES IN ONE COUNTRY: 
PROPERTY TAXATION AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE IN 
NIGERIA 
Of the four countries cited above, the Nigerian case was particularly insightful 
and led to a further study of ten cities in the country. First, even though there is a long 
history of this tax in Nigeria’s major urban centres, the tax has remained 
underdeveloped and under-exploited outside of the major city of Lagos. This was in 
spite of a government policy of 1976, which, as a part of the nationwide reform of 
local government, supported the development of this tax for the purposes of financing 
the increasing array of services which local governments were mandated to provide. 
Second, though local government revenues had increased phenomenally as a 
result of the 1976 reforms, Nigerian local governments have become heavily 
dependent on federation account transfers. Table 4 shows that local government 
revenues increased phenomenally since the nation-wide reform of the local 
government system, effectively arresting the decline in total local government 
revenues. Whereas the federal government made no transfers to local government 
before the reform, federal transfers to local governments rose steeply from 3% in 
1977 to 20% in 1992. Moreover, when Value Added Tax was introduced in 1994, 
local  government  received 30% of the proceeds (see IMF 2001).  Hence, while  local  
16 TABLE 4 
Composition of local government’s revenue in Nigeria 
1962 – 1999(Current Naira) 
Sources  (in % )  1962    1972  1978  1983  1993  1996  1999 




  24  6  17  12      1.0  --      0.1 
Transfers from 
Federal Government 
   --  --  53  76  89  91  94 
Total     100   100  100   100   100  100  100 
N Million      52.2    49.66  264.9 1,334  18,525  23,790 54,124 
Total naira figures for 1972, 1978 and 1983 estimated on the basis of actual totals of sample states and local 
governments. 
Sources:  
World Bank, Nigeria: Options for Long-Term Development, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 
p.159. 
G. O. Orewa and B. Adewunmi. Local Government in Nigeria: The Changing Scene ( Benin: Ethiope Publishers, 
1983). 
Federal Military Government of Nigeria, “Local Government”, Report of the Committee (1984), p. 59-63. 
Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Account 1983 – 194, Lagos. 
 
governments raised 94% of their revenues in 1972; they raised less than 6% some 27 
years later (1999). In the meantime, their total revenue rose phenomenally between 
1962 and 1999. This is further compounded by the fact that the public revenue system 
is heavily dependent on a single product sold on a volatile world market, oil. As the 
responsibilities of local governments grew it has meant that local governments 
financed predictable and basic services relied on by the public – especially the poor – 
from unpredictable revenue sources. Thirdly, partly as a reaction to this fact, a number 
of state governments initiated bold reforms on property rating. 
This study selected ten cities from 7 of Nigeria’s 21 states (1994, they are now 
36 states) representative also of the different regions of the country. Key actors – local 
government council members (33), employees of the councils (36) and ordinary 
citizens (10) of the local governments and citizens – were interviewed and the records 
of these councils were analyzed by the research team. A rough count of actual 
housing properties was also taken in all these ten cities. The following were the 
highlights of the findings from this major research (see table 5): 
•  In absolute terms, local government revenue has increased more than thirty-
fold within a four-year period: 1986 – 1990. Even making allowance for 
inflation this is considered a significant increase. However, within the same 
period, local government’s internally generated revenue (IGR) as a share of 
total revenue (TR) fell from 40.3% to almost a half (22.5%). Even when 
allowance  is  made  for  inflation, this was considerable. Explanations  for  the  
17  TABLE  5   
Municipal Government Revenue in selected cities 1986-1991 
MUNICIPAL  GOVT  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
ABEOKUTA  SOUTH*        
PR/IGR %  20 28 26 19 12 20 
IGR/TR%  34 28 26 19 12     8 
TR (Nm)       5.0       6.4       9.0      12.5     32.3    32.6 
ADOODO/OTA*        
PR/IGR  58 46 48 35 35 37 
IGR/TR  51 38 28 30 18 29 
TR       4.8       5.8       9.3      10.8     19.6     14.4 
IKEJA*        
PR/IGR  45 43 32 44 44 58 
IGR/TR  55 40 36 32 33 17 
TR     17.0     23.6      23.9      27.0     27.2      67.0 
ENUGU*        
PR/IGR  11 13 16 20 27 
IGR/TR  51 23 20 30 18 
TR 
N/A 
     8.1     23.1     18.1      15.0      53.6 
ONITSHA*  (1985)       
PR/IGR  15 11 13 12 18 21 
IGR/TR  38 35 34 43 46 24 
TR     17.4     17.9     23.1     17.3     16.8     30.7 
JOS NORTH        
PR/IGR 8  8  6  12  6  -- 
IGR/TR  25 21 23 21 11   9 
TR     10.1       9.5     11.7     14.5     30.2    28.0 
LAFIA        
PR/IGR 38  00  --  --  --  -- 
IGR/TR  27 52 12 12  8  8 
TR       4.2       1.3       9.8       9.9    20.8  13.5 
KADUNA        
PR/IGR  61 49 59 44 54 54 
IGR/TR  28  21  17  16   5    4 
TR      11.8     16.2     23.5     24.9    57.3     55.9 
ZARIA        
PR/IGR 13  11  6  9  11  13 
IGR/TR  13   8  6  7    1    1 
TR       9.4    13.7   17.4  13.2    17.3    18.6 
KANO        
PR/IGR  N/A   5   5   8  --  -- 
IGR/TR  --  62 58 35 12 15 
TR    23.0     15.6     19.4      9.2      11.5      14.1 
Source: Olowu et al. 199, based on fieldwork.  
Note: Cities with PR policy in asterisks. Kaduna suspended PR in 1992.  
 
decline in IGR when TR is increasing hinges on the huge increase in the share of the 
federation account going to local governments—and the poor accounting for the use 
18 of these resources by powerful local government chairmen who operate as governors 
and presidents at state and federal levels respectively. 
•  Property rates as a proportion of local government internally generated 
revenues has also fallen for most of the sample LGs within the period. Factors 
which are responsible include the relative ease with which other revenue 
sources can be tapped, the fission of several local governments within the 
period, the downturn in the economy which led a number of small scale 
enterprises which pay tenement rates to close down, the difficulty of 
increasing the rate of the tax and the poor and archaic organisational set up for 
managing property tax. 
•  On the other hand, a few local governments especially – all of Lagos state and 
some others in the south west – successfully introduced the property tax, with 
strong support from the state government and in most cases, the World Bank. 
For instance, property rate was only 0.3% in Port Harcourt (a large oil-city) 
but 44% in Ikeja (Lagos) in 1989, rising to 58.3% of the city’s revenue in 
1994 in the latter city. Reason: the latter city was in a state that had a strong 
pro-property tax policy. Property rates also tended to boost overall municipal 
finances (see for instance the contribution of property rates to internally 
generated and total revenues in the asterisked cities on table 6). 
•  Most of the LGs have no good and up-to-date records of the total number of 
properties in their jurisdiction. What exists is either dated or is estimates that 
have very little bearing with reality. Things were generally different in LGs 
that had just introduced or modernized their property rating system. 
•  The staffing of finance departments generally and of tenement rating 
departments leaves much to be desired. But generally in making decisions in 
respect of fiscal matters, LG officials had more input into this process than the 
political class (councillors). This is the case whether we are talking of the 
budget exercise, fund allocation among various sectors although councillors 
play a more visible role in raising additional or new revenue sources. 
•  Contrary to popular beliefs, councillors believe that property rate was 
generally acceptable to the people. It was regarded as equitable and ensured 
that municipal government (MG) infrastructure was improved. They do not 
regard its introduction as an unmanageable political risk but then most of them 
19 have not given serious support in their councils to the idea of generating more 
revenues from this source. 80% of interviewed ratepayers signified their 
willingness to pay the property rates if there was demonstrable benefit in the 
form of better services. 
•  The six most serious financial problems confronting MGs were mandated 
costs from federal and state governments, e.g. for primary education, pressures 
from employees for increased salaries, loss of federal revenue ( especially in 
the field of primary education ), rising service demands from citizens, loss of 
state government revenues ( 10% of Internally Generated Revenue ) and 
inflation. 
•  Municipal governments (MGs) rely on the following strategies to generate 
more revenues are: additional intergovernmental transfers (Onitsha, Jos and 
Kaduna); new local government revenue sources –of which the property tax 
was the most successful (Onitsha, Ota, Abeokuta and Ikeja); deferring some 
payments till the following year (Enugu, Onitsha, Jos and Kaduna); increase 
user fees and charges (Onitsha and Ikeja). Other minor strategies include sale 
of some assets and short-term/long term borrowing. Since many of them 
confront increased expenditure demands, they resort to the following 
expenditure improvement strategies--in order of importance: better 
management; adoption of labour-saving techniques, reduction of capital 
expenditures; contracting out services to the private sector; control of new 
construction; across-the-board cut in all the departments; cutting budget of 
least efficient departments; laying off personnel; shifting responsibilities to 
other unite of government; reducing overtime. 
•  None of the MGs had made a survey of how economic development impacts 
on the LGA but occasional project analysis were conducted to test the 
feasibility. Generally, the advent of huge resources into local governments has 
also been associated with higher cases of financial malpractices and citizen 
apathy towards the local government system. Their citizens perceived many 
councillors and in particular LG chairmen as corrupt. On the other hand, there 
were also some that distinguished themselves by serving their communities, 
especially in Lagos, Ado-Odo and Jos. Most ratepayers will be willing to pay 
higher property rates if there is a clear linkage to service delivery. 
20 •  All MGs except Lafia and Kano Municipality were collecting property rates 
(PR). PR confronts 6 major obstacles, according to their chief finance officers. 
These are: lack of formalized support from councillors; poor house numbering 
(and street naming); lack of personnel – in quantity and quality; public 
criticism; lack of incentives to tax payers; lack of support from State 
Government. As it is to be expected, the extent of these problems varied from 
one MG to another. In some MGs, the responsibility for collecting PR has 
been passed on to Urban Development Authorities (Jos) which may or may 
not share proceeds with MGs. 
•  On the whole, successful MGs (in terms of property rating) tended to engage 
more staff than their less successful counterparts. This is the most outstanding 
difference between these two sets of MGs. The latter had an average of 16 
staffers while the latter had only 6. Some of the less successful MGs (Kaduna 
and Lafia) have no separate department charged with property rating. 
•  The federal and state governments (especially state governments) and private 
wealthy individuals – with substantial properties – tended to have large arrears 
of unpaid rates. None of the MGs has succeeded in imposing sanctions 
because of their weak legal position (enabling law, legal staff, and inadequate 
or non-existing revenue courts). None of the MGs has an incentive system for 
encouraging ratepayers to pay promptly or to pay at all. 
It became evident from the findings that if property rating is to become a 
major revenue source for Nigerian municipal governments, a number of important 
policy and administrative measures must be undertaken by each of the various 
governmental levels: federal, state and local. Some of the policy measures would 
include the promulgation of model legislation on property taxation, which each state 
can adapt to suit its own peculiar conditions. The model law should apply to all urban 
and semi-urban centres in Nigeria and a result, a definition and classification of 
Nigerian cities will be necessary. The model law must also identify local governments 
as property rating authorities, indicate the assessment base, liability, valuation and 
revaluation procedures, exemptions as well as the enforcement mechanisms. Citizen 
representatives (based on community or civil structures) should also be actively 
involved in property assessments. 
21 The administrative measures involve political, technical and institutional 
matters. Political executives must be persuaded of the need to develop the tax and 
must be ready to ‘sell’ it to their electorate. The most important technical issue is the 
development of a land cadastre which incorporates the identification, registration 
mapping of land titles. Land policy – in the direction of full marketisation – should be 
pursued in the cities, while the case for redistribution might be strong in the rural 
areas. New or modified institutional mechanisms may also be required especially in 
setting up and effectively staffing a rating office. 
Finally, federal and state governments must adopt a policy on the payment of 
grants-in-lieu of rates for their properties. Furthermore, the compliance by urban and 
semi-urban local governments with efforts to develop the property tax should form 
important criteria (up to 20% of the amount distributed) for disbursing allocated 
revenues to local governments. 
 
 
7 DISCUSSION  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
In summary then, a paradigm shift has occurred in many developing countries 
in favour of local governance especially since the 1990s. The most intractable 
problem confronting this experiment has been to find a suitable and reliable local 
revenue base. Central government transfers in many countries have been relied upon 
to finance local government revitalization. While this is a welcome development, this 
paper suggests that there are some dangers as well. Of the possible forms of local 
taxes that are possible in many developing countries as we can see the property tax is 
the most highly recommended. Other alternatives such as the poll tax in East and 
West Africa, or octroi in India have been abused and are regressive in terms of their 
impact (see World Bank 1995, Livingstone & Charlton 1998). 
On the other hand, three major problems are usually emphasized concerning 
property tax in developing countries. These emerged in the Nigerian study as well as 
in other studies and writings on the subject. These three problems are valuation, 
assessment and collection (see for instance (Prudhomme 1989, Gboyega 1990). All 
three problems are compounded by the fact that land titles and cadastre are poorly 
developed in most of these societies. The idea that land is government– or 
communally-owned have only aggravated the problem, seriously constraining 
economic growth (De Soto 2002). 
22 The fact that the big political players in politics at the centre are also the 
substantial property owners and are likely therefore to be the ones to pay the tax when 
levied further aggravates the situation. One can understand why there will be strong 
opposition from this group to the tax in many developing countries. Nevertheless, this 
paper suggests that these problems are not insurmountable. For instance, at the 
national level, some breakthroughs have been recorded in improved revenue 
mobilization through the creation of revenue authorities in many LDCs. The few such 
experiments in developing countries aimed at property taxation have been quite 
outstanding – as in Indonesia, the Philippines and Accra in the 1970s and 1980 – 
besides the Nigerian cases described above (Bahl & Lin 1992, Keith 1993). 
The task of raising substantial revenues from the property tax turns on three 
critical considerations. These are firstly, political willingness of the crucial 
stakeholders,  opportunity as presented by the economic base and size of urban 
centres. The third consideration is the capacity. The capacity to implement the tax is 
dependent on the other two variables. If there is a willingness on the part of the key 
stakeholders – the political players at the central and local levels, private and civil 
society actors and donors – and a country has cities of substantial size and economic 
base, all the problems associated with the tax valuation, assessment and collection can 
be tackled with the conventional technologies but new technologies promise to 
enhance this capacity further. 
Political willingness can only materialize if there are real incentives to those 
who wield power. There has to be an acceptance that the property tax represents an 
important investment over time to finance urban infrastructures, which are presently 
in crisis in much of the developing world (Fuchs et al. 1994, Stren & White 1989). 
Given the problematic of financing urban infrastructures in many cities and the 
breakdown in social cohesion, real threats to security of the rich and powerful, a 
program of civic engagement on this subject can help to bring about a sea-change in 
attitudes towards the tax. Donors can make the development of the property tax a 
condition for grants and loans. A close look at table 3 again shows that inequality is 
particularly high in Latin America and Africa. But Latin America has embarked on 
strong programmes of decentralization that has led to huge increases in property tax 
revenues in many cities (Campbell 1997). Even then, the contrast between the 
developing countries generally and the OECD countries for instance remains stark. 
The linkage between infrastructures and development is well established in the 
23 literature and it is not surprising to note that Africa’s status with respect to poverty, 
equity and effective local taxation levels is consistent. 
On the other hand, LDCs cities are growing in leaps and bounds. United 
Nations’ (1990) estimates for year 2020 is that Africa, Asia and Latin America will be 
54%, 56% and 83% urbanized respectively. A substantial number of the large cities 
will also be found in these regions. These urban centres remain the preponderant 
centres of opportunity and growth in the developing world. And, urban land is a major 
source of investment in these countries and it is therefore a veritable source of 
mobilizing resources for declining infrastructures in many developing countries. 
The combination of political willingness and opportunity makes resultant 
improvement in capacity to value, assess and collect property automatic. The property 
tax will not be the only tax to finance urban development in LDCs but it will be one 
of the most important ones. This is not only in terms of its own independent 
contribution to MG revenues but because it will also stimulate other sources such as 
loans for capital development, especially in countries such as Africa where capital 
development projects are heavily dependent on donor funding. Finally, we have 
shown that the development of this tax contributes to the programme of poverty 
alleviation in two ways. First, it will make possible the diversion of more revenues to 
the development of rural areas away from urban areas where the property tax will be 
taxed primarily. Second, the successful introduction of the tax will lead to greater 
progressivity of the tax systems in these countries, thus relieving the poor of the 
unfair heavy burden they bear presently of financing the development of their 
countries. 
As the cities of the developing countries grow in their economic and political 
importance, it will no longer be possible for the central governments to dominate the 
financing of these municipalities. Not only has this policy proven unsustainable, it is 
also likely to undermine the process of accountable governance, democratization and 
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